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Morality and sociability in commercial society: Smith, Rousseau—and Mandeville 
 
This is a post-print version of the article and is not for citation. 
 
In 1756 Adam Smith reviewed Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality and 
claimed that it was indebted to the second volume of Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable 
of the Bees. While much recent scholarship has taken this as the point of departure for 
studying Smith’s engagement with Rousseau, the place of Mandeville in shaping that 
engagement has been largely neglected. This article brings Mandeville back into the 
picture and reassesses Smith’s engagement with both thinkers in light of the connections 
he identified between their works. This involves reconstructing Mandeville’s 
historicized account of the development of sociability and government, and showing 
how Rousseau developed this to articulate his critique of modern society. In evaluating 
Smith’s response to this challenge, it is argued that he only partially succeeded in 
distancing his own analysis of commercial society from Mandeville’s principles. 
 
In his “Letter to the Edinburgh Review” of 1756, Adam Smith offered one of the first commentaries on 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Among Men. “Whoever reads this last 
work with attention,” Smith remarked, “will observe, that the second volume of the Fable of the Bees 
has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau” (ER, 250).1 While other early readers of Rousseau’s 
                                                          
For invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this article I would like to thank Adrian Blau, Charles Griswold, Mark 
J. Hill, Robert Lamb, John Meadowcroft, Paul Sagar, Max Skjönsberg and the referees for The Review of Politics. 
1 The following abbreviations are used for frequently cited primary sources. For Smith: ER = “Letter to the 
Edinburgh Review,” in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1982), 242-256; LJ = Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982); TMS = The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. 
D. D. Raphael and A. L Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982); WN = An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
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Discourse associated it more generally with Epicureanism and Hobbism,2 Smith appears to have been 
unique in emphasizing not just its debt to Bernard Mandeville, but, more specifically, to the second 
volume of his infamous work. Smith’s comments have provided some inspiration for those who have 
sought to uncover the parallels between Mandeville and Rousseau,3 but they also provide an important 
insight into his own thinking at the time and how he viewed certain problems that he would confront in 
his later works. Why, then, did Smith associate Rousseau with Mandeville, and what does this tell us 
about his engagement with both thinkers? 
                                                          
of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). For ease of 
comparison with other editions, references to TMS and WN are given by part/section/chapter/paragraph numbers 
as appropriate. For Mandeville: FB = The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F.B. Kaye in 
2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988). References are given as FB I or FB II to denote the volume, followed 
by page numbers. For Rousseau: DOI = Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, in 
The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 3, ed. Christopher Kelly and Roger D. Masters (Hanover, NH: University 
Press of New England, 1992), 1-95. 
2  Louis-Bertrand Castel, L’homme moral opposé à l’homme physique de Monsieur R****. Lettres philosophiques 
où l’on réfute le Déisme du jour (Toulouse, 1756), 57-58, 173-174; Jean de Castillon, Discours sur l'origine de 
l'inegalité parmi les hommes, pour servir de réponse au discours que M. Rousseau, Citoyen de Genève, a publié 
sur le même sujet (Amsterdam: J. F. Jolly, 1756), 129, 255-266. 
3  Malcolm Jack, “One State of Nature: Mandeville and Rousseau.” Journal of the History of Ideas 39, no 1 (1978): 
119-124; Edward J. Hundert, The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 105-115; idem. “Mandeville, Rousseau and the Political 
Economy of Fantasy,” in Luxury in the Eighteenth-Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods, ed. Maxine 
Berg and Elizabeth Elgar (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 28-40; Mauro Simonazzi, “Bernard Mandeville e Jean-
Jacques Rousseau,” in La filosofia politica di Rousseau, ed. Giulio M. Chiode and Roberto Gatti (Milan: Franco 
Angeli, 2012), 231-237.  
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The “Letter” has become a key text in the recent “explosion of scholarship” on Rousseau and 
Smith,4 since it provides us with Smith’s earliest and most detailed remarks on Rousseau. Indeed, it is 
the strongest evidence indicating that he was concerned with Rousseau’s ideas at all, and is thus the 
basis for establishing any sort of historical relationship between the two thinkers. Getting this 
relationship right, in turn, is deemed especially significant given that Rousseau and Smith are arguably 
two of the earliest and most penetrating theorists of commercial society.5 Rousseau is usually regarded 
as its greatest eighteenth-century critic and Smith as the first person to respond to Rousseau’s concerns 
while defending commercial society.6   
The purpose of this article is to bring Mandeville back into the picture. In so far as the “Letter” 
provides clues to the problems that troubled Smith in the late 1750s, I argue that it was Mandeville—
more than Rousseau—who was really on his mind. While the “Letter” has inspired many scholars to 
think more carefully about both the historical and philosophical connections between Smith and 
                                                          
4  The quote is from Dennis C. Rasmussen’s brief survey of the extant scholarship, “Adam Smith and Rousseau: 
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,” in The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith, ed. Christopher J. Berry, 
Maria Pia Paganelli and Craig Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-56. 
5  The term “commercial society” is associated principally with Smith. It is a society in which the division of labor 
is so entrenched that everyone “lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant” (WN, I.iv.1). This 
also implies a psychological component, as such a society can subsist “from a sense of its utility, without any 
mutual love or affection,” through commercial exchange and observation of the rule of justice (TMS, II.ii.3.2). 
See also Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, ed. Béla Kapossy 
and Michael Sonenscher (London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 3-4. While neither 
Mandeville nor Rousseau used the term “commercial society,” it is plausible to view them as having analyzed the 
type of society that Smith classified as commercial. 
6  Michael Ignatieff, “Smith, Rousseau and the Republic of Needs,” in Scotland and Europe 1200-1850, ed. T.C. 
Smout (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986) 187-189; Ryan Patrick Hanley, “Commerce and Corruption: Rousseau’s 
Diagnosis and Adam Smith’s Cure,” European Journal of Political Theory 7, no 2 (2008): 137-138; Dennis C. 
Rasmussen, The Problems and Promise of Commercial Society: Adam Smith’s Response to Rousseau (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 5. 
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Rousseau, the same cannot be said of the connections between Smith and Mandeville. This article seeks 
to redress the balance. In particular, I focus on Mandeville’s historicized account of the development of 
human sociability and government to reveal its affinities with Rousseau’s better known arguments. 
Mandeville’s account challenges anyone who thinks that humans are naturally sociable creatures or 
who seeks to defend the moral character of commercial society—a challenge reinforced by, but not 
original to, Rousseau’s Discourse. I argue that while Smith set out important aspects of his moral 
philosophy against Mandeville, his own account of both the origins and inner workings of commercial 
society relies on a more Mandevillean analysis than he ever acknowledged.7 In short, Smith’s attempt 
to distance his defense of commercial society from the Mandeville-Rousseau position was a partial, but 
not complete, success.  
Although this article addresses a question principally of interest to Smith scholars, it brings a 
historical perspective to bear on questions about the morality of commercial society that continue to 
divide critics and proponents of capitalism. Indeed, some contemporary critics still regard Mandeville 
                                                          
7  Smith was concerned to distance his moral philosophy from Mandeville and appears troubled by what we can 
assume was the suggestion that he had not done so. See Adam Smith, “Letter to Gilbert Elliot,” in Correspondence 
of Adam Smith, ed. E. C. Mossner and I. S. Ross (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 49. The possibility that 
Smith’s moral philosophy failed to refute Mandeville tends to receive more of a hearing in scholarship focused 
primarily on Mandeville than on Smith. See Thomas A. Horne, “Envy and Commercial Society: Mandeville and 
Smith on “Private Vices, Public Benefits”,” Political Theory 9, no 4 (1981): 562-565; Dario Castiglione, 
“Considering Things Minutely: Reflections on Mandeville and the Eighteenth-Century Science of Man,” History 
of Political Thought 7, no 4 (1986): 485; Maurice M. Goldsmith, “Regulating Anew the Moral and Political 
Sentiments of Mankind: Bernard Mandeville and the Scottish Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49, 
no 4 (1988): 603-604; Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 219-236; Bert Kerkhof, “A fatal attraction? Smith’s 
‘theory of moral Sentiments’ and Mandeville’s ‘fable’,” History of Political Thought 16, no 2 (1995): 219-23; 
Jennifer Welchman, “Who Rebutted Bernard Mandeville?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 24, no 1 (2007): 68-
69. None of these studies, however, consider in detail how Smith’s arguments compare to the historical account 
of sociability from the second volume of the Fable, and only Hundert’s makes anything more than passing 
reference to Rousseau and/or the “Letter to the Edinburgh Review.” 
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as the one person who saw capitalism for what it really is, while dismissing the possibility that Smith 
provided a (successful) defense of its moral character.8 While such critics are right to uncover an 
important challenge to commercial morality in Mandeville, they overlook the possibilities for answering 
Mandeville—and rescuing commercial society—explored by his immediate successors. Few defenders 
of commercial society have ever taken its moral shortcomings as seriously as Smith, so evaluating the 
extent to which he distanced his thought from Mandeville should be of broader interest for those who 
think that the latter divined the true nature of capitalism.  
I proceed by examining the “Letter to the Edinburgh Review” in more detail to uncover why 
Smith associated Rousseau with Mandeville. I then elucidate the challenge posed by Mandeville’s 
arguments in the second volume of the Fable and show how elements of this challenge were accentuated 
by Rousseau. With this challenge outlined, I move on to assessing the extent to which Smith distanced 
himself from Mandeville’s principles. By way of conclusion, I consider an illustrative example to 
suggest how attending to the nuances of the Mandeville-Rousseau-Smith debate can help us to think 
more carefully about the moral character of commercial society. 
 
Mandeville’s place in Smith’s “Letter”  
 
Why did Smith think that the second volume of The Fable of the Bees gave rise to the system of 
Rousseau? Somewhat surprisingly, this question has been widely neglected in existing scholarship on 
Rousseau and Smith, in which Mandeville often appears as little more than a peripheral figure. Some 
studies do not discuss him at all,9 and others mention him only briefly without analyzing his ideas in 
                                                          
8  G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 77-79; Robert 
Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky, How Much is Enough? Money and the Good Life (London: Penguin, 2013), 48-
53. 
9  Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984); Christopher J. Berry, “Adam 
Smith: Commerce, Liberty and Modernity,” in Philosophers of the Enlightenment, ed. Peter Gilmour (Totowa, 
NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1990), 113-132; Ryan Patrick Hanley, “From Geneva to Glasgow: Rousseau and Adam 
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any detail.10 One reason for this neglect is suggested by R. A. Leigh’s comment that “for the modern 
reader, [Smith] perhaps stresses too much what he takes to be the influence of Mandeville on 
Rousseau.”11 Studies that have focused on all three thinkers tend to endorse this view, concluding that 
on many issues “Rousseau is diametrically opposed to Mandeville,”12 or that there are “insurmountable 
differences between Mandeville and Rousseau,” with Smith only identifying “a superficial similarity” 
between them.13 Yet Smith recognized that there were genuine differences between Mandeville and 
Rousseau, but nonetheless thought that the points where they align proved especially significant. Even 
if he was wrong to associate Mandeville and Rousseau so closely—a view I challenge here—the reasons 
why he did so would still prove important for understanding how he viewed certain problems at the 
time.14 
                                                          
Smith on the Theater and Commercial Society,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 35 (2006): 177-202; idem., 
“Enlightened Nation Building: The “Science of the Legislator” in Adam Smith and Rousseau,” American Journal 
of Political Science 52, no 2 (2008): 219-234. 
10  E. G. West, “Adam Smith and Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality: Inspiration or Provocation?” Journal of 
Economic Issues 5, no 2 (1971): 68; Ignatieff, “Republic of Needs,” 189, 200-201; Spencer J. Pack, “The 
Rousseau-Smith Connection: Towards an Understanding of Professor West’s “Splenetic Smith”,” History of 
Economic Ideas 8, no 2 (2000): 46, 49; Hanley, “Commerce and Corruption,” 146-147; Charles L. Griswold, 
“Smith and Rousseau in dialogue: Sympathy, pitié, spectatorship and narrative,” in The Adam Smith Review, 
volume 5: Essays Commemorating the 250th anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Vivienne Brown 
and Samuel Fleischacker (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 61, 63. 
11  R. A. Leigh, “Rousseau and the Scottish Enlightenment,” Contributions to Political Economy 5, no 1 (1986): 
11-12. 
12  Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, trans. John Marrington and Judith White (London: NLB, 1972), 197. 
13  Jimena Hurtado Prieto, “Bernard Mandeville’s heir: Adam Smith or Jean Jacques Rousseau on the possibility 
of economic analysis,” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 11, no 1 (2004): 2, 4-14. 
14  Equally, however, we should be wary of inferring intellectual influence too quickly given the difficulty of 
knowing precisely why Smith wrote the “Letter.” See Paul Sagar, “Smith and Rousseau, after Hume and 
Mandeville,” Political Theory, online first (2016). Sagar’s caution regarding the “Letter” is in response to stronger 
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Amongst many of the most detailed and nuanced discussions of the “Letter to the Edinburgh 
Review,” the question of why Smith focused on the second volume of the Fable is rarely asked.15 This 
is important given that Mandeville’s position underwent significant changes between the different 
volumes, to the extent that one recent commentator even concludes that the two volumes “do not appear 
to have that much in common apart from the title and the author.”16 What is more, the two volumes 
were first published together only in 1755, so Smith would have originally encountered them as separate 
works.17  
                                                          
positions than that defended here and, more broadly, we agree that the influence of Rousseau on Smith has been 
overstated. While our arguments are complementary, Sagar takes a different approach by largely leaving the 
“Letter” aside and instead arguing on independent grounds that Mandeville, and especially Hume, were more 
important than Rousseau as interlocutors for Smith. 
15  For example Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-
1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-76; Eric Schliesser, “Adam Smith’s benevolent and 
self-interested conception of philosophy,” in New Voices on Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 343-346; Rasmussen, Problems and Promise, 59-71; Nicolas Phillipson, Adam Smith: 
An Enlightened Life (London: Penguin, 2010), 144-148; Shannon C. Stimson, “The General Will after Rousseau: 
Smith and Rousseau on Sociability and Inequality,” in The General Will: The Evolution of a Concept, ed. James 
Farr and David Lay Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 353-358. Two notable exceptions 
are Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 34; and Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, 19-20. Both rightly point out that the 
second volume of the Fable focuses more on the historical development of humanity and sociability, but neither 
examines this development in any detail and it has little impact on the main claims they make about the 
relationship between Rousseau and Smith. 
16  Mikko Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume: anatomists of civil society (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2013), 134.  
17  Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, 156, and see 103-146 more generally on the publishing history of the Fable. 
Tolonen quotes Smith’s remark about volume two of the Fable as evidence that its influence “remained a well-
established fact in eighteenth-century Scottish thought” (156). However, he provides no further discussion of the 
aspects of Mandeville’s thought that Smith associated with Rousseau. 
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To see why Smith identified the second volume of the Fable as Rousseau’s inspiration, it is 
necessary to examine the “Letter” in some detail. Smith proceeds by imploring the Review to extend its 
scope beyond Scotland and take notice of important works published elsewhere in Europe, which, in 
practice, would involve focusing mainly on France and England. After surveying some of the literary 
and scientific achievements of both nations, Smith turns to consider “morals, metaphysics and part of 
the abstract sciences.” All improvements in modern times with regards to these have been made in 
England, and he lists Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Butler, Clarke and Hutcheson as all 
having made original contributions to this branch of philosophy (ER, 249-250). However, it has since 
been neglected by the English and taken up in France, most notably in Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Inequality. Smith’s commentary here is worth quoting at length: 
Whoever reads this last work with attention, will observe, that the second volume of the 
Fable of the Bees has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau, in whom however 
the principles of the English author are softened, improved, and embellished, and stript 
of all that tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has disgraced them in their 
original author. Dr. Mandeville represents the primitive state of mankind as the most 
wretched and miserable that can be imagined: Mr. Rousseau, on the contrary, paints it 
as the happiest and most suitable to his nature. Both of them however suppose, that there 
is in man no powerful instinct which necessarily determines him to seek society for its 
own sake: but according to the one, the misery of his original state compelled him to 
have recourse to this otherwise disagreeable remedy; according to the other, some 
unfortunate accidents having given birth to the unnatural passions of ambition and the 
vain desire of superiority, to which he had before been a stranger, produced the same 
fatal effect. Both of them suppose the same slow progress and gradual development of 
all the talents, habits, and arts which fit men to live together in society, and they both 
describe this progress pretty much in the same manner. According to both, those laws 
of justice, which maintain the present inequality amongst mankind, were originally the 
invention of the cunning and the powerful, in order to maintain or to acquire an 
unnatural and unjust superiority over the rest of their fellow creatures. Mr. Rousseau 
9 
 
however criticises upon Dr. Mandeville: he observes, that pity, the only amiable 
principle which the English author allows to be natural to man, is capable of producing 
all those virtues, whose reality Dr. Mandeville denies. Mr. Rousseau at the same time 
seems to think, that this principle is in itself no virtue, but that it is possessed by savages 
and by the most profligate of the vulgar, in a greater degree of perfection than by those 
of the most polished and cultivated manners; in which he perfectly agrees with the 
English author (ER, 250-251). 
 
Smith adds that Rousseau’s depiction of the life of savages is one-sided, focusing only on their 
indolence, but, in presenting the savage life as the happiest, “the principles of the profligate Mandeville 
seem in him to have all the purity and sublimity of the morals of Plato, and to be only the true spirit of 
a republican carried a little too far” (ER, 251). As the Discourse “consists almost entirely of rhetoric 
and description,”18 there would be no purpose in analyzing it further; instead, Smith translates three 
passages at length from the second volume of the Discourse, before noting his approval of Rousseau’s 
dedication to the republic of the Geneva (ER, 254). 
Amongst scholars who have taken Smith’s “Letter” as the starting point for evaluating his 
response to Rousseau, the most fruitful approach has been to focus on the three translated passages, 
some of which reappear in very similar form in his later works (where Rousseau is not mentioned 
explicitly).19 One consequence of foregrounding these passages, however, is that the comparison with 
                                                          
18  Some commentators have jumped on this comment to argue that Smith dismissed the substance of Rousseau’s 
arguments and was interested only in his eloquence and style. See Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 220; West, 
“Inspiration or Provocation?” 69; Robert Wokler, “Todorov’s Otherness,” New Literary History 27, no 1 (1996): 
52. However, this reading completely overlooks the reason why Smith was reviewing Rousseau’s Discourse in 
the first place, which was to draw attention to the one French work, above all others, that had taken up the branch 
of modern philosophy lately neglected in England. 
19  Schliesser, “Smith’s conception of philosophy,” 343-344; Hanley, “Commerce and Corruption,” 139-140; 
Rasmussen, Problems and Promise, 68-71. 
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Mandeville drops into the background. My approach here, by contrast, foregrounds Smith’s comparison 
of Mandeville and Rousseau to understand better his engagement with both thinkers.   
Smith identifies four substantive points of agreement between Mandeville and Rousseau. He 
also notes some important points where the two diverge, but identifying the points of agreement seems 
to have been his overriding concern. He sometimes even accentuates these in order to downplay the 
differences, as the first point of comparison illustrates. Despite Mandeville having presented the 
primitive state of mankind as the most wretched, and Rousseau having presented it as the happiest, they 
both argue that humans have no natural instinct to seek society for its own sake. Throughout both 
volumes of the Fable, Mandeville consistently denied that humans naturally seek society for its own 
sake. His most nuanced defense of this denial, however, is developed in the final dialogues of volume 
two, published in 1728, where, for the first time, he examines the historical causes of human sociability 
in detail (FB II, especially 177-193). This is much the same approach to the question of human 
sociability as Rousseau takes in the Discourse, so focusing on the second volume of the Fable is key 
when assessing the extent to which their views on sociability converge.  
The allusion to the historicity of volume two of the Fable is stronger in the second point of 
agreement Smith identifies. While noting that Mandeville and Rousseau provide different reasons for 
why humans would have left their primitive state, Smith suggests that these differences amount to little, 
since they end up telling a very similar story about the slow progress in the arts, talents and habits that 
enabled humans to live together in society. The gradual, developmental account of society was one of 
the most important additions to Mandeville’s later theory. Indeed, in volume two of the Fable, he 
arguably presents a “conjectural history” of sociability and government—a term that, retrospectively, 
was used to describe Smith’s own approach,20 but which equally applies to Mandeville and Rousseau. 
To understand the origins of political society, Mandeville explains, “I go directly to the Fountain Head, 
human Nature itself … When Things are very obscure I sometimes make Use of Conjectures to find 
my Way” (FB II, 128). Similarly, Rousseau sought to provide “the hypothetical history of 
                                                          
20  Dugald Stewart, “Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith,” in Smith, Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects, 293. 
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Governments,” based on “hypothetical and conditional reasonings” (DOI, 16, 19, 42). In each case, 
Mandeville and Rousseau speculate on how underlying principles of human nature would have 
developed in different stages of human history. It was most probably the historicity of volume two of 
the Fable that Smith had in mind when drawing the connection with Rousseau’s Discourse, which 
suggests that attending to his own historical analysis of the origins of society and government might 
help to reveal how he addressed the problems Mandeville and Rousseau were grappling with. 
The third point of agreement is that Mandeville and Rousseau both think that the laws of justice 
were the invention of the cunning and powerful to consolidate their superiority over the poor.21 Smith 
might have had the first volume of the Fable in mind here, as in “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral 
Virtue” Mandeville notoriously argued that the first rules of morality were the invention of skillful 
politicians so “that the Ambitious might reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast Numbers of them 
with the greater Ease and Security” (FB I, 47). Rousseau presents a similar account of the origins of 
political societies as a confidence trick towards the end of the Discourse (DOI, 53-4). However, it is 
possible that Smith could have been referring to the second volume of the Fable here as well, where the 
account still relies on leaders emerging who learn to devise “various ways or curbing Mankind” (FB II, 
268), even if this claim appears less striking as a result of having been integrated into Mandeville’s 
more developed historical narrative. 
The fourth and final point of agreement concerns pity. Smith notes that Rousseau explicitly 
criticized Mandeville for failing to realize that pity is the source of many of the social virtues whose 
reality the Fable denies. This point does not refer to the second volume. Smith is pointing to the only 
explicit discussion of Mandeville in the Discourse, where Rousseau’s analysis is based on “An Essay 
on Charity, and Charity-Schools” from the (second edition of the) first volume of the Fable (DOI, 36-
37; cf. FB I, 254-256). It has recently been suggested that Smith is praising Rousseau here for having 
                                                          
21  Smith advances a similar (but not identical) argument himself (LJ, 208, 404; WN, V.i.b.12). See also Pack, 
“Rousseau-Smith Connection,” 52-53; Schliesser, “Smith’s conception of philosophy,” 346, but cf. Hont, Politics 
in Commercial Society, 21-22, 48-49. 
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advanced beyond Mandeville.22 Once again, however, he appears more concerned with the underlying 
affinity between their positions, as they both maintain that pity is more prominent amongst savages and 
the vulgar than it is amongst civilized peoples. Even for Rousseau, Smith thinks, the principle of pity is 
not itself a virtue. While Smith would similarly argue that pity may even be found amongst criminals 
and “is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane” (TMS, I.i.1.1), he also sought to refute the 
idea (as I show later) that sociable sentiments are more prevalent amongst savages than civilized 
peoples. 
From the foregoing analysis it should be clear that when Smith identified volume two of 
Mandeville’s Fable as the inspiration for Rousseau’s Discourse, he most probably had in mind their 
conjectural histories of society and government. To see why this matters for understanding his 
engagement with both thinkers it is necessary to elucidate Mandeville’s conjectural history in more 
detail and show how, channeled through Rousseau, it challenges the moral character of modern society. 
 
Mandeville’s challenge, channeled through Rousseau 
 
In “A Search into the Nature of Society,” Mandeville proclaimed that “it is impossible we could be 
sociable Creatures without Hypocrisy” (FB I, 349), since living in civil society involves concealing and 
masking our naturally unsociable passions. The question of human sociability pitted Mandeville against 
the third Earl of Shaftesbury and this remained one of the central themes of volume two of the Fable, 
which comprises six dialogues between Cleomenes, representing Mandeville, and Horatio, who starts 
out as an admirer of Shaftesbury but is converted by the dénouement.  
One of the most important developments in volume two is Mandeville’s distinction between 
self-love and self-liking.23 Self-love is the desire all animals have for their own preservation. Self-liking 
is more complicated. Not only do we overvalue ourselves in relation to others, but, moreover, our 
                                                          
22  Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, 20, 26. 
23  For more extensive accounts of how this distinction plays out in the historical narrative of volume two see 
Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 52-115; Tolonen, Mandeville and Hume, 65-102. 
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awareness of this makes us uneasy and gives rise to a desire to have our worth affirmed by others: “the 
Approbation, Liking and Assent of others … strengthen and confirm us in the good Opinion we have 
of ourselves” (FB II, 129-130). Self-liking, then, is the passion that leads us to desire the good opinions 
of others and it frequently manifests itself in pride. This passion is central to understanding how we 
could ever have become sociable for Mandeville, as is most apparent in his discussion of politeness.  
Mandeville argues that self-liking would lead to war and contention amongst untaught savages, 
since everyone would desire that others recognize their superior worth, while at the same time failing 
to acknowledge the worth that others desire. There is nothing intrinsically sociable about self-liking 
(FB II, 132-134). The problems it poses amongst uncivilized peoples, however, are remedied by the 
development of politeness, which must have developed spontaneously, without reflection, over a great 
period of time (FB II, 138-141). If we were to declare our true sentiments around others then we would 
become insufferable to them, but we gradually learn to hide these sentiments so as not to offend those 
whose approval we desire. This is what good manners and politeness are all about for Mandeville, and 
they originate in self-liking. There is, therefore, an element of deceit inherent in human sociability, for 
it is only by concealing our natural sentiments that we appear sociable to others.  
Mandeville turns to address the question of sociability more directly in the fourth dialogue, 
where he situates himself between the extremes of Hobbes and Shaftesbury. To the former he attributes 
the position that we are “born with Hatred and Aversion, that makes us Wolves and Bears, to one 
another,” while the latter holds that there is “a natural Affection, that prompts [man] to love his species” 
(FB II, 177-178). Mandeville is concerned to explain precisely what it means to say that humans are 
sociable, and he distinguishes between two ideas of sociability. First, that humans are naturally more 
fond of society than other creatures; and, second, that the consequences of associating together turn out 
to be better for humans that for other animals. Mandeville denies the first of these ideas. Anticipating 
an argument now associated more with Rousseau, he claims that savages would have had few desires 
and thus little need of society. It is difficult for those of us born into society, he later adds, to imagine 
the simplicity of savage life (FB II, 285). We become fond of society once industry and society have 
given rise to ever-increasing desires, but it is only amongst civilized people that the “Love Man has for 
his Ease and Security, and his perpetual Desire for meliorating his Condition, must be sufficient Motives 
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to make him fond of society” (FB II, 180-181). This fondness for society is the effect, rather than the 
cause, of humans associating together. 
Mandeville thinks that the second idea of human sociability has more going for it. We strive 
for our own happiness and over time we chance upon discoveries that eventually lead to the 
establishment of political societies. Somewhat paradoxically, we become sociable “only by living 
together in society.” Humans are designed for society in much the same way that grapes are for wine; 
it is only by being carefully squeezed together under the right conditions that sociability emerges (FB 
II, 185, 188-189). Mandeville’s overriding point, then, is that it is only as humans experience the 
benefits of social interaction that they start to become sociable themselves. 
This account of human sociability provides the basis for the conjectural history of government 
in the final two dialogues. Mandeville again stresses that it would have taken many generations “and 
the Concurrence of many favourable Accidents” for societies to have formed from private families (FB 
II, 200). To explain the origins of government it is first necessary to identify the principle in human 
nature that would drive some people to govern others. This principle is the “Desire of Dominion,” or 
desire for superiority, which is a consequence of our pride (FB II, 204-205). Having identified this 
principle, the stages by which humans moved from families to society could be traced. 
The first motive leading savages to associate together would be the danger posed by wild beasts 
(FB II, 230-232, 238-242). As families started living together in small societies, however, the greatest 
threat would soon become the pride and ambition of other people, leading to contention. Mandeville 
envisaged this state of human development as miserable. People would not keep contracts longer than 
their interest in doing so lasted, and “their unruly Passions, and the Discords occasioned by them, would 
never suffer them to be happy.” It is the domineering passions based on pride and self-liking that make 
this state miserable, but, over a few generations, leaders would emerge who are able to find ways of 
curbing the passions of others through penalties and prohibitions, thereby making themselves obeyed 
(FB II, 266-268). Even at this stage, however, the administration of justice would be impractical and 
precarious. Stable government could not arise until language and writing are perfected. The final step 
to government, then, is the invention of letters, for 
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No Multitudes can live peaceably without Government; no Government can subsist 
without Laws; and no Laws can be effectual long, unless they are wrote down: The 
Consideration of this is alone sufficient to give us a great Insight into the Nature of Man 
(FB II, 269). 
 
To explain the invention of letters, however, a more fundamental problem had to be addressed 
concerning the origins of speech or language, which Mandeville returned to later in the sixth dialogue. 
This problem was central to many eighteenth-century debates about the history of sociability and 
civilization, especially for Rousseau and Smith, and is important for assessing the extent to which Smith 
distanced himself from Mandeville.24 In their most primitive condition, Mandeville argues, savages 
would have had no language and speech would have developed gradually over time. The original motive 
for speech would not have been the desire to make oneself understood, but, instead, the desire to 
persuade others. This persuasion could take the form of seeking praise for our actions and attributes, or 
of making others submit to our desires (FB II, 289). Either way, it is self-liking and the desire for 
dominion that explain the origins of speech; the “natural Ambition and strong Desire Men have to 
triumph over, as well as persuade others, are the occasion of all this” (FB II, 291).  
Once speech is perfected and humans are governed by written laws, great progress could finally 
be made: property and safety may be secured, the division of labor occurs and industry increases, with 
the “Love of Peace” spreading as the benefits of civilized society become widely recognized (FB II, 
283-284). It is only once regular laws are established and observed that “Multitudes may be kept in 
tolerable Concord among themselves,” which is impossible until human understanding has advanced 
well beyond the state of savages (FB II, 300). Mandeville’s conjectural history of government, then, 
focuses on showing how self-liking, or pride, and the consequent desire for dominion, play out in 
different stages of the move from savage to civilized society. He stresses that the more civilized we 
                                                          
24  For helpful analysis of this wider debate and Mandeville’s place in reviving an Epicurean account of the origin 
of languages see Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16-38. 
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become the more injurious we find it to have our true nature seen (FB II, 303). We are at greater pains 
to ensure that others think highly of us, and we thus put on a façade to conceal our natural sentiments 
and appear sociable to others. 
This is not an explanation of sociability that would be particularly attractive to anyone who 
thinks that humans are naturally moral or sociable creatures. Much of Mandeville’s infamy rested on 
his attempt to explain away any inherently sociable or moral characteristics in terms of self-liking and 
pride. Nonetheless, he still regarded civilized society as a clear improvement on savage life. But, as 
Smith saw so perceptively, Rousseau was able to adopt Mandeville’s moral psychology to articulate a 
penetrating critique of modern society.  
Rousseau appears to have read volume two of the Fable closely and at times almost seems to 
be paraphrasing the French translation.25 While it is unlikely Smith would have noticed this, some of 
the parallels between Mandeville’s and Rousseau’s accounts would have been evident. They begin from 
a similar stating point: the denial of natural sociability. While Rousseau identifies pity as a distinct 
principle from self-love (amour de soi-même), he also distances this principle from sociability (DOI, 
15). Pity is a natural aversion to witnessing the suffering of others, but, as Smith recognized, this is still 
some way short of a desire to seek society for its own sake. For Rousseau, it would have taken a great 
deal of time and chance circumstances for humans to be drawn together in societies. Like Mandeville, 
he recognizes that part of the problem here involves explaining the origins of language, and although 
he does not offer a solution to the problem in the Discourse, he presents the problem in such a way as 
to reinforce the difficulties with maintaining that humans are naturally sociable (DOI, 33-34). 
The most important differences between Mandeville’s and Rousseau’s conjectural histories 
concern the earliest stages of human development. Rousseau ridicules the idea that savages would have 
been driven to unite through fear of wild beasts (DOI, 22), and it takes him much longer to arrive at the 
point where the desire to be esteemed by others leads to contention. As has often been noted, Rousseau’s 
distinction between amour de soi-même and amour-propre approximates Mandeville’s distinction 
                                                          
25  Hundert, Enlightenment’s Fable, 113. 
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between self-love and self-liking (DOI, 91).26 Rousseau, however, views amour-propre as a historically 
contingent passion, and by charting the development and interaction of pity and amour-propre he could 
conceive a pre-agricultural stage in human history where families would have united together into small 
societies, without being driven into conflict by their desire for the approval of others. On reflection, 
Rousseau claims, this state must have been “the best for man” (DOI, 48). 
The recovery of this golden age in human history provided Rousseau with an evaluative 
benchmark against which subsequent developments could be viewed as corrupting the species, which 
is ultimately why he diverged so sharply from Mandeville and other defenders of commercial society 
at the time.27 The comparison of savage and civilized societies was crucial to the evaluation of the latter, 
and on this point Mandeville and Rousseau clearly disagreed. Nonetheless, when it came to explaining 
social interaction in more developed societies they had a very similar story to tell.28 For Rousseau, 
amour-propre, or Mandeville’s self-liking, became a problem as the commercial arts started to develop 
and the division of labor occurred, especially following the revolutions of metallurgy and agriculture. 
It is only with the development of agriculture that property in land first becomes recognized and 
inequalities between people are multiplied (DOI, 48-51). It was at this stage, with amour-propre 
dominant, that 
… for one’s own advantage, it was necessary to appear to be other than what one in fact 
was. To be and to seem to be became two altogether different things; and from this 
distinction came conspicuous ostentation, deceptive cunning, and all the vices that follow 
from them. … in a word, competition and rivalry on one hand, opposition of interest on 
                                                          
26  Jack, “Mandeville and Rousseau,” 121-122; Force, Self-Interest before Smith, 65; Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of 
the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 116; Christopher Brooke, Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius 
to Rousseau (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012), 182-184. 
27  See Robin Douglass, Rousseau and Hobbes: Nature, Free Will, and the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2015), 82-93.  
28  See also Rasmussen, Problems and Promise, 63-64. 
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the other; and always the hidden desire to profit at the expense of others. All these evils 
are the first effect of property and the inseparable consequence of nascent inequality 
(DOI, 51-52). 
 
Smith translated this passage at length, as he did Rousseau’s later comparison between the savage who 
“lives within himself” and the “sociable man” who lives “only in the opinion of others,” for whom 
everything “is reduced to appearances, everything becomes artificial and deceptive” (DOI, 66; ER, 252-
253). Rousseau agreed with Mandeville that what passes for sociability in modern societies is based on 
deceit and hypocrisy, but he went much further in stressing that the extent of artifice and dissimulation 
is accentuated by increased commercial activity under conditions of inequality. Modern society places 
us in competition with one another, yet we still have to appeal to the interest and opinion of others to 
survive; we compete for reputation and the esteem of others as much as we do for material goods. It is 
precisely the gulf that opens up between how we really are and how we must appear to others than 
makes civilized life so miserable on Rousseau’s account. 
In charting the rise of amour-propre in the development of modern society, Rousseau channeled 
Mandeville’s ideas about how self-liking leads us to put on a mask of sociability. Where for Mandeville 
self-liking and the desire for dominion characterize our social condition, for Rousseau (to quote again 
from a passage Smith translated), it is only once “the words power and reputation” come to mean 
something that human misery ensues (DOI, 66; ER, 253). In each case, modern society is characterized 
by our living in the opinion of others and putting on whatever sort of façade is necessary to acquire the 
reputation we desire. This is the challenge to which anyone who sought to defend the moral character 
of commercial society would have to respond. Smith took the challenge seriously. 
 
Smith’s response to the Mandevillean challenge 
 
The “Letter to the Edinburgh Review” indicates that Smith recognized the extent to which Rousseau’s 
critique of modern society was based on Mandeville’s principles. Indeed, it is plausible to think that the 
publication of the Discourse on Inequality alerted Smith to the fact that the most troubling ethical 
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questions Mandeville raised had been avoided by those like Hume, who took a more favorable stance 
towards modern commerce.29 In what ways, then, did Smith respond to the challenge articulated by 
Mandeville and channeled through Rousseau, and how successful was he in distancing his own thought 
from their positions? 
Part of Smith’s response involved repudiating some of the principles of human nature on which 
Mandeville’s position rested. There are reasons to think that Mandeville and Rousseau were in Smith’s 
sights from the opening paragraphs of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published only three years after 
the “Letter.” Many scholars have discussed the extent to which Smith’s principle of sympathy engages 
with Mandeville and/or Rousseau. 30  While sympathy underpins Smith’s moral philosophy, it is 
arguably the love of praiseworthiness that provides his most direct response to the position he attributed 
to Mandeville and Rousseau: the denial of any desire leading us to seek society for its own sake. 
Mandeville’s self-liking and Rousseau’s amour-propre lead us to desire the high opinion or praise of 
others, irrespective of whether that praise is really merited. But Smith insists that nature has implanted 
another principle in man: 
Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but 
with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves 
of in other men. The first desire could only have made him wish to appear to be fit for 
society. The second was necessary in order to render him really fit (TMS, III.2.7). 
 
                                                          
29  Phillipson, Enlightened Life, 141-148. 
30  Leigh, “Rousseau and the Scottish Enlightenment,” 12; Kerkhof, “A fatal attraction?” 233; Pack, “Rousseau-
Smith Connection,” 45-46; Force, Self-Interest before Smith, 14-20; Griswold, “Smith and Rousseau,” 61-64; 
Phillipson, Enlightened Life, 149-150; Hont, Politics in Commercial Society, 27-28; Stimson, “Smith and 
Rousseau on Sociability and Inequality,” 358-361. 
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Where Mandeville and Rousseau (arguably) focused only on the first desire, for Smith the second is all-
important. In addressing the question of human sociability here, 31  Smith counters the distinction 
between appearance and reality that Rousseau had emphasized (in passages Smith translated). The 
façade of sociability Mandeville and Rousseau had depicted is precisely that—pseudo-sociability—but 
Smith insists that there are principles in human nature that can make us genuinely fit for society. We 
desire the approbation of an impartial spectator, who sees our motives clearly and would disapprove of 
us deceiving others for our own gain, even if we would receive unmerited praise in doing so. Crucially, 
for Smith, the love of praiseworthiness cannot be reduced to the love of praise. We do not seek to be 
praiseworthy just so we receive praise. The virtuous amongst us would be content with performing 
praiseworthy actions even if no actual praise was forthcoming. If anything, indeed, it is the other way 
around, and we desire the praise of others because this strengthens our sense that we are genuinely 
praiseworthy (TMS, III.2.3). There is, then, nothing objectionable about the love of praise itself, except 
for when we desire praise where none is due, which would be “the effect only of the most contemptible 
vanity” (TMS, III.2.8). At various points Smith indicates that the praise-praiseworthy distinction 
confutes Mandeville (TMS, III.2.27, VII.ii.4.7), and, in light of the “Letter,” the distinction could be 
taken as a way of answering Rousseau too.32 Mandeville had been right to stress the extent to which we 
desire the esteem and approbation of others (TMS, VII.ii.4.10-11), but wrong to think that that we desire 
this irrespective of whether we merit such approbation. 
                                                          
31  Smith never uses the term “sociability”—probably to distance himself from Francis Hutcheson—but passages 
like these (and those on “social” and “unsocial” passions) indicate that he is addressing similar questions to 
Mandeville and Rousseau. To clarify, when I refer to genuinely sociable sentiments in Smith, I mean sentiments 
that lead us to seek society for its own sake (i.e. the view of sociability that Smith claims Mandeville and Rousseau 
reject in the “Letter”). Smith himself lists “Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and 
esteem, all the social and benevolent affections” under the “social” passions (TMS, I.ii.4.1). 
32   Ignatieff, “Republic of Needs,” 200-201; Hanley, “Commerce and Corruption,” 141-144; Rasmussen, 
Problems and Promise, 118-119; Phillipson, Enlightened Life, 156; but cf. Sagar, “Smith and Rousseau.” 
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While Mandeville never used the phrase love of praiseworthiness, he did consider the 
possibility that we are motivated by such a desire: “if Reason in Man was of equal weight with his 
Pride, he could never be pleas’d with Praises, which he is conscious he don’t deserve” (FB I, 63). But 
pride is far more powerful than reason. The desire for unmerited praise, and aversion to being justly 
blamed, is often to be observed, especially amongst children who have not yet learned to hide their 
passions in such a way as to make them appear more sociable than they really are.33 Even if Smith was 
right to identify the love of praiseworthiness as an independent principle from the love of praise, 
Mandeville could still counter that the former fails to explain much about human behavior in modern 
society. To put the point another way, even if it is granted that we are naturally sympathetic creatures 
who desire to be praiseworthy, more needs to be said to distance Smith’s analysis of commercial society 
from Mandeville’s and Rousseau’s: it needs to be shown that these genuinely sociable sentiments are 
at play in such societies. Smith also took up this challenge, with mixed success.34 
As is evident from the “Letter,” Smith was not persuaded by Rousseau’s portrayal of savage 
life. By contrast, he thought it counted strongly in civilized society’s favor that even its poorest day-
laborers enjoy more of the conveniences of life than a savage chief or Indian prince (LJ, 338-341, 489, 
521-2; WN, I.i.11). In this respect, he might be viewed as having restated the Mandevillean argument 
about the misery of savage life against Rousseau. But in another respect he took issue with both 
                                                          
33  Bernard Mandeville, An Enquiry Into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War (London, 
1732), 7-8. 
34  In taking up this challenge, Smith never explicitly claims to be responding to Mandeville and/or Rousseau, and 
my interpretation thus encounters a similar problem to that faced by much of the existing scholarship on Smith’s 
engagement with Rousseau. The claim that Smith had Mandeville and/or Rousseau in mind at different points 
where neither is mentioned is plausible, but remains somewhat speculative. However, my argument need not rest 
on such a strong claim. My weaker and less speculative claim is simply that Smith addressed the issues raised by 
the Mandevillean challenge, irrespective of whether he saw himself as responding to Mandeville and/or Rousseau 
directly. As the preceding analysis hopefully establishes, Smith would have been well aware of Mandeville’s and 
Rousseau’s views on these issues, and had gestured towards them explicitly in the “Letter.” 
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Mandeville’s and Rousseau’s accounts of the difference between savage and civilized life. Mandeville 
and Rousseau both granted the existence of pity, which is the closest thing in their theories to a naturally 
sociable sentiment. Yet, as Smith noted in the “Letter,” they both claimed that this sentiment is strongest 
amongst savages and weakens with the development of society. At a number of points in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, however, Smith maintains that sociable sentiments are more prevalent in civilized 
societies than savage ones.  
Smith thought that the security and affluence characteristic of civilized nations allows for the 
virtues “founded upon humanity” (humanity being a “social” passion) to be cultivated more than the 
virtues “founded upon self-denial and the command of the passions.” In savage nations, where all 
struggle to secure their own subsistence, the opposite is true: savages lack sympathy with one another 
and interact more as strangers than as friends. It is only once people become more comfortable in 
securing the necessities of life that they are able to express their emotions more freely and develop 
greater sensibility towards the sentiments of others. Crucially, for Smith—in stark contrast to 
Mandeville and Rousseau—it is savages who most often have to conceal their passions from others and 
thus acquire “habits of falsehood and dissimulation,” whereas civilized people are more open and 
sincere (TMS, V.2.8-13). It is not just inherently sociable sentiments that Smith thinks are more 
cultivated in civilized societies, but also the sentiments of justice (TMS, VII.iv.36) and those associated 
with prudence, such as probity and punctuality, which are almost unknown in barbarous nations and 
develop only with the introduction of commerce (LJ, 528, 538-539). While justice and prudence are not 
inherently sociable sentiments, their prominence does help to deflect the charge that commercial society 
is characterized by deceit. The “prudent man,” Smith claims, while “not always much disposed to 
general sociality,” nevertheless steers clear of “the cunning devices of an artful imposter” and “is always 
sincere” (TMS, VI.i.7-9).35 
Where Mandeville and Rousseau saw deceit and hypocrisy as central to an analysis of 
commercial society, Smith thought that these vices were less to be found in commercial societies than 
                                                          
35  Similarly, the virtue of justice is based on sympathizing with the victim’s resentment, but resentment itself is 
an “unsocial passion” (TMS, I.ii.3.1-8; II.ii.1-3). 
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in savage or barbarian ones. In this respect he clearly distanced himself from the Mandevillean analysis, 
but other tensions remain when assessing the moral character of commercial society. Perhaps the most 
famous of these concerns Smith’s worries about the effects of the division of labor, which, amongst its 
many degrading tendencies, renders the laboring poor incapable “of conceiving any generous, noble, or 
tender sentiment,” and threatens to extinguish “all the nobler parts of the human character” (WN, 
V.i.f.50-51; see also LJ, 539-541). Here, however, I focus on a different tension that has received far 
less attention, but which comes into sharper view in light of Mandeville’s conjectural history from 
volume two of the Fable. That is, while Smith in many places avowed that sociable sentiments are more 
prevalent in commercial societies than in savage or barbarian ones, when explaining both the historical 
emergence and inner workings of commercial society he falls back on a much more Mandevillean 
position, where such sentiments seem to be doing very little explanatory work. A passage towards the 
end of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is particularly instructive: 
The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading and directing other 
people, seems to be one of the strongest of all our natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct 
upon which is founded the faculty of speech, the characteristic faculty of human nature. 
… Great ambition, the desire of real superiority, of leading and directing, seems to be 
altogether peculiar to man, and speech is that great instrument of ambition, of real 
superiority, of leading and directing the judgments and conduct of other people (TMS, 
VII.iv.25). 
 
Smith speculates that the origins of language might be explained in terms of the desire to persuade 
others. While Mandeville is not mentioned explicitly here, the passage captures a great deal of his view 
on the relation between language, persuasion and self-liking from volume two of the Fable: not only is 
speech about persuading others, the reason why we seek to persuade others is because we desire 
superiority over them.36 This point is crucial when examining the extent to which Smith distanced his 
                                                          
36  Cf. Samuel Fleischacker, On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 93-94, who argues that persuasion recognizes the independence of 
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analysis from Mandeville, but it has rarely received any scholarly attention.37  It has at least two 
important implications. 
First, the natural desire we have to persuade others is the principle from which the propensity 
to truck, barter and exchange derives. This propensity, in turn, gives rise to the arts, commerce and 
division of labor, which eventually lead to the great opulence and wealth of modern commercial 
societies (LJ 352, 493-494, 527; WN, I.ii.1-2). In short, the propensity to barter—derived from the desire 
to persuade others—does much of the explanatory work in Smith’s history of modern society. There is, 
however, nothing inherently sociable about this all-important desire in explaining the eventual 
development of commerce; “it is not marked with anything amiable” (LJ, 527), but, as Mandeville 
stressed, is bound up with self-liking and superiority. It is worth remembering this when Smith writes 
that a commercial society is one in which everyone “becomes in some measure a merchant” (WN, 
I.iv.1). It is far from evident that there is anything genuinely sociable about the interactions that 
characterize such societies; after all, society subsists amongst merchants “from a sense of its utility, 
without any mutual love of affection” (TMS, II.ii.3.2). The social bonds that characterize commercial 
society, then, are in fact more akin to the second of the two ideas of sociability Mandeville canvassed 
than the first: humans are sociable in the sense that they come to recognize the benefits of associating 
together, not because they are naturally fond of society.38 
Second, the desire of persuading others is closely related to ambition, which has an important 
role in Smith’s theory. The distinction of ranks that preserves peace and order in society is based on 
ambition, which, despite being a selfish passion, is nonetheless admirable when kept within the bounds 
of prudence and justice (TMS, III.6.6-7). Yet the admiration accorded to the higher ranks in society 
                                                          
those we seek to persuade and shows them respect. Fleischacker is right to argue that persuasion has more 
favorable connotations than force, but he downplays its association with the desire for superiority.  
37  A notable exception is Kerkhof, “A fatal attraction?” 232-233, but he does not discuss this point in any detail. 
38  This is not to deny that Smith thinks that humans naturally desire the company of others and take pleasure in 
mutual sympathy. My claim, more specifically, is simply that this desire does not characterize the social bonds 
specifically associated with commercial society. 
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might be viewed as a problem for reasons similar to those Mandeville and Rousseau diagnosed. In the 
sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), Smith adds a chapter on the corruption of our 
moral sentiments—directly following the chapter on ambition and the distinction of ranks—which has 
been taken as evidence that he was still concerned with the challenge posed by Mandeville and 
Rousseau right down to the end of his life.39 The way Smith deals with the worry about corruption helps 
to illustrate both the extent and limitations of his attempt to distance himself from Mandeville’s 
principles. 
“The great mob of mankind,” Smith recognizes, admire power and riches more than virtue and 
wisdom, and this threatens to corrupt our moral sentiments. While virtue and wisdom are praiseworthy, 
power and riches are far more reliable objects of praise, irrespective of their merit. This creates a 
problem because “we desire both to be respectable and to be respected”—or to be both praised and 
praiseworthy—and these desires can pull us in different directions (TMS, I.iii.3.2). The problem, as 
Mandeville and Rousseau had highlighted, is that doing what is praiseworthy is not always the best way 
to satisfy our desire for praise (our self-liking or amour-propre). Smith’s response is telling. While he 
acknowledges that this is the case amongst the highest echelons of society,40 he denies that it applies to 
“the middling and inferior stations of life, [where] the road to virtue and that to fortune … are, happily, 
in most cases, very nearly the same.” For most of us, he claims, “honesty is the best policy” (TMS, 
I.iii.3.5).  
This response involves denying the prevalence of the problem as Mandeville and Rousseau saw 
it. Once again, Smith rejects the idea that hypocrisy and deceit are the best ways to advance our interests 
in civilized societies. Prudence and honesty instead provide the surest path to bettering our condition. 
However, Smith does not deny that when the desires for praise and praiseworthiness come into conflict 
                                                          
39  John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 394. 
40  Indeed, at points Smith suggests that “the rich and  the great” become less sociable and generous as feudalism 
gives way to commercial society, as their fortunes are increasingly spent on “frivolous objects” that display “a 
base and selfish disposition,” rather than in hospitality (WN, II.iii.42, II.iv.5). 
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the former will most often prevail. Mandeville and Rousseau may well have been right about this, but 
it is the fortunate contrivance of nature that this tension does not affect most of us, most of the time. To 
put the point another way, Smith simply disagreed with Mandeville and Rousseau on the question of 
how best to satisfy prudence and self-liking in commercial society, but it remains these passions, rather 
than any genuinely sociable sentiments, that are key to understanding how commercial society operates.  
In what sense, then, is there a tension in Smith’s response to the Mandevillean challenge? 
Against Mandeville (and perhaps Rousseau), Smith insists that we desire not just to be praised, but to 
be praiseworthy, and the latter desire (neglected by Mandeville) renders us genuinely sociable. What is 
more, challenging the position he attributed to Mandeville and Rousseau in the “Letter,” Smith claims 
that our sociable sentiments are more refined and widespread in civilized societies, in comparison with 
savage societies, where falsehood and dissimulation are rife. However, the tension arises given that the 
love of praiseworthiness and the more sociable sentiments Smith associates with civilized societies 
appear to be doing very little explanatory work when he comes to analyze how commercial society 
originates and operates. Indeed, love of praiseworthiness—as opposed to love of praise—arguably does 
no explanatory work for Smith in explaining either the historical development towards commercial 
society, or how a commercial society actually functions. For these explanations, Smith reverts to a much 
more Mandevillean position, where the desire to persuade others and ambition play a much greater role.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The point of departure for this article was Smith’s “Letter to the Edinburgh Review,” where he claims 
that Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality was inspired by volume two of Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. 
While much recent scholarship has drawn on the “Letter” to analyze Smith’s response to Rousseau, the 
question of why he associated the Discourse with volume two of the Fable has been largely neglected. 
This neglect is especially surprising given that the “Letter” is the one place where Smith situates 
Rousseau’s work in a specific intellectual context; it is thus one of the few clues we have for trying to 
work out what he saw in Rousseau. If what I have argued here is right, the “Letter” indicates that Smith 
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was as much troubled by Mandeville—and arguably more so—than he was by Rousseau, contrary to 
the impression given by much recent scholarship on Rousseau and Smith.  
 Imagine that Anne, an up-and-coming philosopher, reviews a new work by Ben, another up-
and-coming philosopher. At the beginning of Anne’s review she notes that John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism seems to have given rise to the principles at the heart of Ben’s philosophy, before 
highlighting some of the main points of comparison between their works. Anne and Ben become two 
of the leading thinkers of their generation, and later—perhaps centuries later—others become interested 
in the intellectual relationship between them. Not so many people then read Rawls as they do today. 
Anne’s review is frequently invoked as a key piece of evidence showing the extent to which she was 
occupied with Ben’s philosophy during a formative period of her intellectual career. Occasionally 
people make passing reference to Rawls’s influence on Anne and/or Ben, while perhaps quoting an odd 
passage from A Theory of Justice, despite Anne’s signaling that it is Political Liberalism that really 
matters.  
 Something similar, I suggest, is how the relationship between Smith, Rousseau and Mandeville 
has been presented in much recent scholarship. One aim of this article has simply been to encourage 
Smith scholars to attend more closely to volume two of the Fable. None of this is to deny that Smith 
was concerned with Rousseau’s thought, but what made Rousseau especially interesting was the way 
he turned Mandeville’s principles into a powerful critique of commercial society. To answer that 
critique, Smith ultimately had to distance his own defense of commercial society from Mandeville’s 
principles.  
I have argued that although Smith succeeded in distancing his analysis of the moral character 
of commercial society from Mandeville and Rousseau up to a point, in important respects he remained 
far more Mandevillean than he would ever have acknowledged. This is because Smith’s own views on 
human sociability were not as far removed from volume two of the Fable as his praise-praiseworthiness 
distinction might lead us to think. Much like Mandeville, Smith thought that we are driven by desires 
for superiority and persuading others, which give rise to ambition and the propensity to truck, barter 
and exchange. Where Rousseau argued that such desires, associated with amour-propre, become 
increasingly inflamed and divisive with the development of modern society, Smith (following 
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Mandeville) thought that in commercial societies these desires are harnessed in less harmful ways than 
in earlier forms of society. Smith may not have regarded these desires as inherently vicious in 
Mandeville’s sense, but nor did he regard them as genuinely sociable. 
Reconstructing Smith’s engagement with Mandeville and Rousseau helps us to see precisely 
what was at stake between three of the most important interlocutors in the eighteenth-century debates 
on the moral character of commercial society. It is difficult to be too prescriptive regarding what should 
be taken from past debates when confronting questions about the morality of commercial society—or 
capitalism—today, but an illustrative example might help to show how it can at least lead us to think 
more carefully about those questions. My example is taken from G. A. Cohen’s Why Not Socialism?, 
which is particularly relevant given that he was such a fierce critic of the moral motivations behind 
capitalism, and turned to both Mandeville and Smith to uncover its true nature. For Cohen, capitalism 
is based on the “repugnant motives” of greed and fear. Smith apparently recognized this, but 
“propounded a wholly instrumental justification of market motivation, in face of what he acknowledged 
to be its unattractive intrinsic character.” In this respect, Smith supposedly followed the idea epitomized 
by Mandeville’s subtitle: Private Vices, Public Benefits.41 Cohen’s view, however, elides the very 
complexity of Smith’s position—and that of the debate into which he intervened—which is precisely 
what makes that position so interesting. 
Smith, of course, did justify commercial society on instrumental grounds, most notably in his 
famous invisible hand passage, which is often read as part of his response to Rousseau.42 There he 
makes the very Mandevillean point that the poor benefit from the “luxury and caprice” of the rich 
despite the selfishness of the latter (TMS, IV.1.10). This instrumental point is probably Smith’s most 
celebrated justification of commercial society, but it is only one element in a wide-ranging defense. In 
particular, Cohen’s contention that Smith considered capitalism intrinsically unattractive misses much 
                                                          
41  Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 77-79. 
42  Ignatieff, Needs of Strangers, 111-113; Fleischacker, Wealth of Nations, 107-108; Brooke, Philosophic Pride, 
205-206. 
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of what was at stake between him and Mandeville (and Rousseau), for at least two reasons that the 
foregoing analysis illuminates. 
First, for Mandeville, Rousseau and Smith, the question of whether commercial society is 
intrinsically unattractive largely turned on whether it results in us becoming more hypocritical and 
deceitful than we would otherwise be (in non-commercial societies), or whether it promotes openness 
and sincerity. On this question, Smith’s position was in stark opposition to Mandeville’s and 
Rousseau’s. Second, Smith thought that commercial society was characterized by the virtues or 
prudence and justice, rather than the repugnant motives of fear and greed. Indeed, while self-love is 
central to Smith’s analysis of commercial society, he maintained that amongst most people it manifests 
itself in the virtue of prudence far more than the vice of greed, or avarice. This is not to suggest that 
Smith’s analysis should be taken as the last word on the subject, but the questions that separated him 
from Mandeville and Rousseau are still worth asking if we are concerned with the morality of 
capitalism. Returning to these debates, then, is one way to broaden our perspective on the questions we 
should be asking, which is not to say that our answers should be the same. But if the principles of 
Mandeville, channeled through Rousseau, still present one of the greatest challenges to those who 
defend the moral character of commercial society, then Smith still provides one of the most thoughtful 
answers to that challenge, precisely because he took it so seriously. 
